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Abstract: Law is crucial to the maintenance and reproduction of capitalism. While Marx never 
produced a comprehensive theory of law, state and rights, there is much in his work, and in 
the broader Marxist tradition, that can help us understand the nature and role of law in con-
temporary capitalism. This paper sketches out some of the key resources from within the Marx-
ist tradition that can assist us in developing Marxist understandings of law, state and rights 
today. Specifically, the focus is on the question of method, drawing out three key strands from 
Marx's own work: (i) the importance of dialectical materialist analysis; (ii) the historically spe-
cific and transitory nature of capitalism and (iii) the centrality of class antagonism and class 
struggle. The argument advanced here, in sum, is that Marxist explanations of law, state and 
rights should foreground these analytical reference points, in order to make the role of law 
intelligible, and to begin to sketch how movements for fundamental social change might un-
derstand and engage with the law. 
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1. Introduction  
Law, in its myriad forms, plays a crucially important role in the maintenance and repro-
duction of the capitalist mode of production. Rights, property rules, contracts, criminal 
codes, constitutions, international treaties and the jurisprudential traditions that de-
velop around them, all serve to structure and legitimate social relations within capitalist 
societies. Notwithstanding the importance of law, in this regard, Marx never produced 
a comprehensive theory of law, state and rights, on a par with his critique of political 
economy in Capital (Cain 1974; Fine 1984). As a result of this the first generation of 
Marxists never really developed a thorough theory of the bourgeois state (Lukács 
1970, 61), and “the whole of the classical Marxist tradition bequeathed a deathly si-
lence” on the issues of law, state and rights (Hunt 1992, 110). 
Throughout the twentieth century, particularly at times of pronounced capitalist cri-
sis, a number of prominent Marxists did seek to develop thoroughgoing accounts of 
the role of law, state and rights in the reproduction of capitalism. Each of these theo-
rists, from Pashukanis (1978) and Renner (1949) to Althusser (1971), Poulantzas 
(1978) and Thompson (1975), made important interventions and further enhanced, one 
way or another, Marxist analyses of law, state and rights. At the same time, each of 
these interventions has marked shortcomings: from the one-sided and undialectical 
presentation of bourgeois legality in Pashukanis, through Renner’s misplaced reform-
ism, the political quietism of Althusser, and Thompson’s unwarranted faith in the rule 
of law. As such there is much to be gained from revisiting “Marx’s Marxism” (Draper 
1977, 18) in order to orientate Marxist analyses of law, state and rights today.1 
                                            
1 There is, of course, much interesting scholarship on the relationship between law and Marx-
ism, over and above the work of these canonical thinkers in the Marxist tradition. For a useful 
overview of the field, see the repository maintained at: https://legalform.blog.  
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In this brief intervention, the central argument put forward is that it is from Marx’s 
method (broadly conceived) that we can gain most in developing analyses of law, state 
and rights today. In particular, it will be argued that there are three key themes in Marx’s 
work that should inform Marxist approaches to the study of law, state and rights, 
namely: (i) the centrality of dialectical materialism; (ii) recognising the historically con-
tingent and transitory nature of capitalism; and (iii) foregrounding class antagonism as 
central to understanding the dynamics of capitalist social relations.  
2. The Centrality of Method 
The collected works of Marx and Engels contain numerous discrete references to law, 
state and rights (Cain and Hunt 1979). However, in these various references there is 
no coherent, consistent theory or perspective. For example, in The German Ideology 
Marx and Engels state their unequivocal opposition to law (Marx and Engels 1845/46, 
209), while later in Volume 1 of Capital (Marx 1867, Chapter 10) and in his Inaugural 
Address of the Working Men’s International Association (Marx 1864) Marx lauds the 
successful struggle to have the ten-hour day enshrined in law, as a triumph for the 
working class. In The Communist Manifesto the state is construed in purely instrumen-
tal terms as a committee for managing the affairs of the ruling class (Marx and Engels 
1848, 486) while at other times its relative autonomy is appreciated and stressed (En-
gels 1886 and 1890). And finally, across the voluminous collected works of Marx and 
Engels rights are both derided and defended at different times (O’Connell 2018). 
As such, there is little to be gained from what Hal Draper terms “pointless quotation-
mongering” (Draper 1977, 17), or attempting to hang a complete Marxist theory of law, 
state and rights on this or that isolated statement or argument. There is no single or 
definitive Marxist theory of law, state and rights present in the work of Marx. This is 
because Marx, in spite of his ambition, did “not produce, as is sometimes supposed, a 
theory of everything” (Harvey 2012, 5). In place of comprehensive answers as to how 
to approach and think about the role of law, state and rights under capitalism, what we 
get from Marx is “methodological suggestions about the questions to be asked and 
where to start with answering them” (Hunt 2004, 602). This point about the centrality 
of method is made even more expansively by Lukács, who argued that even if we 
“Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the 
results of Marx’s investigations. It is not the ‘belief’ in this or that thesis, nor the 
exegesis of a ‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively 
to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to 
truth and that its methods can be developed, expanded and deepened only 
along the lines laid down by its founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all 
attempts to surpass or ‘improve’ it have led and must lead to over-simplification, 
triviality and eclecticism” (Lukács 1971, 1). 
We may prefer to eschew the language of orthodoxy as antiquated or unhelpful, but 
even allowing for that, the point that Lukács makes here is of central importance. 
Namely that while we can learn from what Marx (and Engels) said specifically about 
law, state and rights, there is no need or value in simply trying to find the one, “correct” 
Marxist stance on law, state and rights. Rather, we can and should focus our attention 
on the methodological framework that Marx’s work provides us with and use this as 
the starting point for developing Marxist analyses of law, state and rights adequate to 
the challenges of capitalism today. 
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3. Dialectical Materialism  
C.L.R. James argues that it is “impossible to deal with Marxism” unless upon the basis 
of dialectical materialism (James 1999, 44). Similarly, Bertell Ollman argues that all “of 
Marx’s theories have been shaped by his dialectical outlook […] and it is only by grasp-
ing dialectics that these theories can be properly understood, evaluated and put to use” 
(Ollman 2003, 4). It is important to recognise both elements of this methodological 
foundation in Marx’s work – dialectics and materialism. These two elements are cru-
cially related, and integral to one another – as Chase puts it, within this schema mate-
rialism provides the roadmap, but would be useless without the compass supplied by 
dialectics (Chase 1997, 33). As Marx himself noted, he took the dialectical method 
developed by Hegel and revolutionised it, by shifting the focus from abstract contradic-
tions between ideas, to identifying the material contradictions in social life (Marx 1867, 
102-103). 
Marx’s appropriation of aspects of Hegel’s dialectical method (abstraction, contra-
diction, negation etc.) is augmented by his emphasis on materialism. In his well-known 
Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx elaborates on his 
materialist philosophy, noting that over time his studies had led him to the conclusion 
that “neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by 
themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but 
that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life” (Marx 1859, 262). 
Marx develops this point further, when he argues that  
“In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production ap-
propriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of produc-
tion. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic struc-
ture of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political super-
structure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, po-
litical and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness” 
(Ibid., 263). 
It follows from this that in approaching questions of law, state, and rights, Marxist anal-
yses should begin by stressing the specific historical and material conditions that give 
rise to particular legal forms. At the same time, this has to be supplemented with a 
dialectical understanding of specific legal forms not as things, but as complex and con-
tradictory processes and relationships. Not static and one-sided, but dynamic, contra-
dictory and changing. As Chase notes, stasis “represents appearance only, contradic-
tion is the truth. Everything, in an odd but important way, is constantly in the process 
of becoming its opposite” (Chase 1997, 39). 
Adopting this approach means contesting and rejecting liberal and legal formalist 
understandings of law as the natural embodiment of “human reason” (Montesquieu 
1949/1748, 6). Instead, Marxist analyses should stress the specific and complex ways 
in which particular legal or state forms correspond to and bolster the prevailing mode 
of production. This does not entail a simplistic or mechanical deployment of the base-
superstructure metaphor. Instead, Marxist analyses can and should acknowledge the 
relative autonomy that legal regimes take on over time, while always stressing the ul-
timately determining role of the mode of production (Engels 1890). It should be 
stressed here that it is the production of surplus-value (in the form of profits, interest 
650 Paul O’Connell 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2018. 
and rents) which predominates within the capitalist mode of production, and that this 
is a social (dynamic, changing and contradictory) relationship, rather than a material 
thing (Harvey 2012, 15). In this context law, state and rights are elements of the com-
plex set of social relations which contribute to the reproduction of capitalism, and not 
just epiphenomenal reflections of the material base (Steinberg 2016). 
It follows that Marxist analyses should endeavour to avoid the ahistorical, meta-
physical and one-sided accounts of law, state and rights produced by liberal and left-
liberal critical theorists alike. Instead of either blindly valorising existing forms, or dis-
missing them out of hand, Marxist analyses should focus on tracing the concrete ma-
terial relationships that produce and sustain given legal or state forms. Alongside this, 
Marxist analyses have to be attentive to the complex, contradictory and dynamic char-
acter of given legal forms or relationships. Failing to do so runs the risk of falling back 
into idealist or metaphysical accounts or critiques of law, state and rights that do not 
touch the reality of social relations, and the possibilities for fundamental change.  
4. The Specificity of Capitalism  
Dialectical materialism should form the starting point for Marxist analyses of law, state 
and rights. However, this aspect of Marx’s method, in the strict sense, needs to be 
complemented with two other crucial elements. The first of these flows almost directly 
from Marx’s application of dialectical materialism to the study of social transformation 
over time. It is the historical contingency and transience of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction. In this regard, Marx argued that the rational and revolutionary aspect of dia-
lectics “includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition 
of its negation” (Marx 1867, 103). It follows from this that “the present society is no 
solid crystal, but an organism capable of change and constantly engaged in a process 
of change” (Marx 1867, 93). 
The second point here is as important as the first. The capitalist mode of production, 
with its attendant social forms, emerges at a specific historical stage, and in due course 
will be superseded. This leads to what Paul Sweezy refers to as an important “major 
premise” for Marxists: the transitory character of capitalism (Sweezy 1946, 22). This 
does not imply teleological certainty, or iron laws of historical development, but adopt-
ing an understanding of the capitalist mode of production and its social forms as con-
tingent and transitory is crucial for orientating Marxist analyses of concrete issues in 
their broader, historical context.  
In Marx’s broad theoretical schema, capitalism as a historically contingent social 
form is not static but riven with fundamental contradictions that presage its transfor-
mation. Class contradictions (to which we return below) are central here. As Rühle 
argues, for Marx class struggle becomes a “law of historical evolution” with “socialism 
as the necessary and logical outcome of that struggle” (Rühle 1929, 392). This latter 
point provides a crucially important political and theoretical premise for Marxist analy-
sis, namely the inevitability of socialism. This point is well made by James, who argues 
that 
“[…] the inevitability of socialism remains an imperative necessity for Marxists 
as a conception. The reason is this: we have a lot of objective facts before us, 
historical events, an immense variety of happenings. When you observe them 
you have to decide which you support, which will advance the perspectives you 
have, and which are acting against these perspectives. Which, in other words 
[…] are leading in the advance toward a socialist society and which are not, 
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which are leading, with the basic Marxist conception, to barbarism” (James 
1999, 44). 
The inevitability of socialism, on this understanding, provides a crucial “criterion of 
judgment” for developing and orientating Marxist analyses (Ibid.). 
When it comes to Marxist analyses of law, state and rights, two key implications 
flow from this aspect of Marx’s methodological framework. The first is that Marxist anal-
yses have to dispute and contest the naturalness of existing legal and state forms. The 
bourgeois2 theorist treats capitalism as natural, inevitable, and self-evident and as 
such views existing legal forms and relations as “the necessary relations arising from 
the nature of things” (Montesquieu 1949/1748, 1), or as the “necessary components of 
a just society” (Harel 2014, 3). In contrast, a central task for Marxist analyses is to show 
how particular legal forms arise, not as the inevitable product of reason, but contin-
gently, in specific historical contexts coloured by the prevailing mode of production.  
The second crucial point which follows, is that not only are given legal and state 
forms historically contingent, but transitory also. This latter point is particularly im-
portant today. For Marx and Engels, the entirety of their political and theoretical work 
was dedicated to building and supporting a movement which would abolish “the pre-
sent state of things” (Marx and Engels 1845/46, 49). In contrast, much contemporary 
Marxism is marked by a quietism (Anderson 1979) which, while holding to the forms of 
Marxist analysis, has broken with the fundamental idea of Marxism as the theory and 
practice of human liberation. Instead, Marxism in this vein “becomes a theory of capi-
talist domination” (Holloway 2012, 516). 
Interestingly, we then arrive at a position where both mainstream (positivist, formal-
ist, natural law) and critical accounts of law end up as two sides of the same coin. The 
former seeking to rationalise or perfect extant legal forms, while the latter engages in 
a one-sided “thrashing” of prevailing legal norms, but with both ultimately retaining the 
capitalist mode of production as an unalterable premise. In contrast to either of these 
perspectives, Marxist analyses should neither valorise the extant order nor succumb 
to resigned fatalism. Appreciating the historical contingency and transience of capital-
ism and its attendant legal and state forms, allows for the development of analyses 
which rejects the false necessity of existing relations (Sweezy 1946, 22), but also pro-
vides a criterion for identifying, developing and supporting changes that advance the 
broader cause of fundamental social transformation.  
5. Class Struggle 
The final element of Marx’s methodological framework is the centrality of class strug-
gle. Without having the space to go into the debates on class and class analysis in any 
great depth here, it is important to make a few brief points. Class, for Marx, is the 
fundamental contradiction at the heart of the capitalist mode of production (Wood 1988; 
Mészáros 1995). Class exploitation is the defining factor within Marxist analyse, but 
understood properly it does not discount or discard the other, crucially important, va-
lences of oppression, be it gender, race, caste or sexuality. Finally, class in the Marxist 
tradition, is best understood as the structural relationship of specific groups of people 
to control over the appropriation of surplus-value (Draper 1977, 14). Crucially, what 
                                            
2 The term bourgeois is used here to refer to the very broad range of thinkers that view the 
capitalist order “as the absolute and ultimate form of social production, instead of as a histor-
ically transient stage of development” (Marx 1867, 96).
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this means is that irrespective of how people subjectively define and understand them-
selves, as temporarily frustrated millionaires or whatever, the vast majority of people 
remain, under contemporary capitalism, working class (Mohun 2016).  
From his earliest philosophical works, through to his mature political economy and 
in everything between, Marx stressed the centrality of class antagonism and class 
struggle to his understanding of how capitalism emerged, functions and develops over 
time. In his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx had al-
ready arrived at a position which stressed the fundamental contradictions between 
meaningful human emancipation and the institution of private property. From this he 
concluded that that the “heart” of human emancipation is the nascent proletariat, and 
that the attainment of such emancipation will necessitate "the negation of private prop-
erty” (Marx 1844, 187). 
As is well known, in The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels identified class 
struggle as the motor force of historical change and charged the international working 
class with the responsibility of suppressing and transcending the capitalist mode of 
production (Marx and Engels 1848). It is noteworthy, that not only in these political 
interventions, but also in his most mature scientific work, Marx returns time and again 
to the centrality of class struggle. For example, in the Postface to the second edition 
of Capital Volume I, Marx notes that the appreciation which Capital gained “in wide 
sections of the German working class is the best reward for my labours” (Marx 1867, 
95). Similarly, in the Preface to the French edition of Capital, Marx notes that making 
the work accessible to the working class is, for him, a consideration which “outweighs 
everything else” (Ibid., 104). 
Class antagonism and class struggle, then, is the “foundation of all of Marx’s poli-
tics”, and fundamentally colours his methodological approach to understanding the 
capitalist mode of production (Draper 1977, 14). The fundamental dynamic which char-
acterises capitalism is the contradiction between the capitalist class and the working 
class. As capitalism is a system predicated on the ceaseless expansion of capital, and 
as this is accomplished through the exploitation of labour there is inherent within the 
capitalist mode of production an irreducible conflict between the interests of the two 
classes.  
The augmentation of capital results in the exploitation and degradation of labour 
and the working class. As Marx puts it at the end of Volume 1 of Capital: 
“[…] all methods for the production of surplus-value are at the same time meth-
ods of accumulation; and every extension of accumulation becomes again a 
means for the development of those methods. It follows therefore that in propor-
tion as capital accumulates, the lot of the labourer, be his payment high or low, 
must grow worse […] It establishes an accumulation of misery, corresponding 
with accumulation of capital. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, 
at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil slavery, ignorance, bru-
tality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i.e., on the side of the class that 
produces its own product in the form of capital” (Marx 1867, 709). 
The processes of capital accumulation and the reproduction of the capitalist mode of 
production result in a system of inequality and unfreedom for the working class, and 
the attendant systemic inequality that comes with this (Wright 2005). 
In marked contrast to the reality produced by the operation of the capitalist mode 
of production, the ideology of liberal legalism posits a world of free and equal individu-
als, engaged in the pursuit of rational self-interest, which legitimates systemic class 
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inequality and antagonism “by denying their existence” (Wood 1988, 14). As Montes-
quieu once put it, as soon as the state of nature is abandoned only “the protection of 
the laws” can make people free and equal (Montesquieu 1949/1748, 111). Likewise, 
Dicey waxed lyrical about the majestic equality of the law, which “every man, whatever 
be his rank or condition” is subject to equally (1982/1915, 114). And this tradition is 
kept alive by contemporary theorists, who maintain that strong legal protections are a 
“necessary precondition for freedom” (Harel 2014, 7). 
In contrast to this idealisation of existing legal rules and forms as natural, neutral 
and conducive to equality and freedom, a central task of Marxist analyses of law, state 
and rights is to highlight the role they play in structuring and legitimating societies riven 
with class inequalities and contradictions. In this regard there is some truth in both the 
claim that “bourgeois jurisprudence” is “the will of [the ruling class], made into a law for 
all” (Marx and Engels 1848, 501) and the observation that the law is rarely “the harsh, 
unmitigated, unadulterated expression of the domination of one class” (Engels 1890, 
60). 
At this point all of the elements of Marx’s method discussed so far come together, 
as they must in any concrete analysis. Given legal rules, rights or state forms will al-
ways be the product of concrete historical developments and contestations. As such 
any given rule will reflect a combination of the objective requirements of the mode of 
production, and the subjective balance of forces between contesting classes. It is im-
portant to try to bring all of these aspects into relief, in order to avoid all the ills of 
reification, quietism or simplistic mechanical materialism. 
For example, the recent round of proposals for mega-regional trade deals (TTIP, 
TPP etc. with NAFTA as an early forerunner) are an attempt to address the structural 
crisis of capitalism (Mészáros 1995). In this regard, these proposed new legal regimes 
respond to a structural need of the mode of production (restoring profitability), as well 
as advancing the interests of specific factions of capital. At the same time, these pro-
posed agreements were opposed by broad collations of trade unionists, environmen-
talist and others throughout Europe, Asia and Latin America. The proposed agree-
ments have, for now, been put on hold, but as and when something approximating the 
original proposals re-emerges, it will be the product of both the objective requirements 
of the changing mode of production, and of class struggle. 
Generalising from this, Marxist analyses of law, state and rights should stress the 
role that given legal forms perform in structuring, and ideologically legitimating funda-
mentally class divided societies. At the same time, Marxist analyses should be atten-
tive to the contradictions prevailing in given regimes, and the potential within them to 
advance the immediate interests of working class and other subaltern groups. As a 
matter of politics, informed by the insights of dialectical materialist analysis, it is possi-
ble to appreciate that legal rhetoric and rules which “disguise the nature of ruling 
power” can “simultaneously” become site of struggle “for those who would dislodge 
that very power” (Chase 1997, 56). This latter point is crucially important, because 
Marxism provides us with a way of understanding “social reality which [provides] the 
appropriate theoretical basis for changing it” (Lukács 1970, 93). 
Class antagonism and class struggle provide the fulcrum on which Marx’s entire 
method hinges. It brings together the dialectical materialist understanding of the cen-
trality of material contradictions to social change, with the historical contingency and 
transience of capitalism. As such Marxist analyses of law, state and rights have to be 
able to account for the messy and contradictory ways in which legal and state forms 
fundamentally sustain the extant mode of production, while also mediating and crys-
tallising (for a time) the class antagonisms at the heart of capitalism. 
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6. Conclusion 
As noted at the outset, Marx’s work does not provide us with a comprehensive theory 
of everything, into which we can simply plug in contemporary data and get the correct 
conclusion. In particular, Marx’s work does not provide us with a clear and consistent 
statement as to how we should approach the important questions as to the role of law, 
state and rights. With that said, Marx’s work does provide us with “a basic and irre-
placeable template” (Harvey 2012, 18) upon which we can begin to construct our own 
analyses of law, state and rights today. 
The outline argument presented here is that dialectical materialism, the historical 
contingency and transience of the capitalist mode of production, and class struggle are 
the central methodological reference points that we can and should take from Marx to 
inform the development of Marxist analyses of law, state and rights. It is important to 
recall in all of this that while Marx may be lumped in with Weber and others in the 
pantheon of great social scientists, his work represents so much more than just another 
critical resource. Marx’s entire life’s work was, as per his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, 
concerned with understanding the reality of capitalism, so as to change it. There is no 
easy way to map this revolutionary commitment onto methods for understanding law, 
state and rights, but that is the challenge which we must confront.  
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